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Philosophy and T heology
The importance o f hum an dignity has been highlighted in the public eye both 
by the book commissioned by the President’s Council on Bioethics titled Human  
D ignity and Bioethics and also by the Vatican declaration Dignitas personae} A 
num ber o f recent works have also critiqued hum an dignity in a variety o f ways, and 
this reflection responds to a few o f these negative appraisals.1 2 In his article “The 
Stupidity o f Dignity,” Steven Pinker argues against the usefulness o f dignity as a 
central principle in bioethics.3
In addition to the ambiguity o f the term  “dignity,” Pinker sees three problems 
with making use o f dignity as a central principle o f bioethics, namely, that dignity 
is relative, fungible, and can be harm ful. We should therefore reject m aking use o f 
“hum an dignity” in arguments about bioethics and rely solely on “autonomy.” To 
illustrate the problematic nature o f appeals to dignity, Pinker writes,
First, dignity is relative. One doesn’t have to be a scientific or moral relativist 
to notice that ascriptions of dignity vary radically with the time, place, and 
beholder. In olden days, a glimpse of stocking was looked on as something
1 Adam Schulman, Edmund Pellegrino, and Thomas W. Merrill, eds., Human Dignity 
and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President’s Council on Bioethics (Wash­
ington, D.C.: U.S. Independent Agencies and Commissions, 2008); and Congregation for 
the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction Dignitas personae on Certain Bioethical Questions 
(September 8, 2008).
2 These negative evaluations of human dignity can have profound effect on the legal 
culture. For a helpful appraisal of an earlier and influential critique of human dignity, see 
John Keown and David Jones, “ Surveying the Foundations of Medical Law: A Reassessment 
of Glanville Williams’s The Sanctity o f  Life and the Criminal Law,” Medical Law Review 
16.1 (Spring 2008): 85-126.
3 Steven Pinker, “The Stupidity of Dignity: Conservative Bioethics’ Latest, Most 
Dangerous Ploy,” New Republic, May 28, 2008, http://www.tnr.com/article/the -stupidity 
-dignity.
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shocking. We chuckle at the photographs of Victorians in starched collars 
and wool suits hiking in the woods on a sweltering day, or at the Brahmins 
and patriarchs of countless societies who consider it beneath their dignity to 
pick up a dish or play with a child.4
A problem Pinker faces is that autonomy is also relative. The importance o f autonomy 
in contemporary discourse can be traced historically to the philosophy of Immanuel 
Kant, who considered it always contrary to autonomy, the self-given law o f practical 
reason, to com m it suicide for any reason whatsoever, to lie about any m atter with 
any intention in any circumstance, or to have sexual intercourse outside o f marriage. 
Many contemporary philosophers enlist autonomy as a justification for conclusions 
that are contradictory to the ones drawn by Kant. I f  dignity cannot work as a central 
principle in bioethics because it is relative historically, autonomy cannot work as a 
central principle in bioethics for the same reason.
P inker offers another rationale for dropping d ignity  from  the bioethics 
vocabulary:
Second, dignity is fungible. The [President’s] Council and [the] Vatican treat 
dignity as a sacred value, never to be compromised. In fact, every one of us 
voluntarily and repeatedly relinquishes dignity for other goods in life. Getting 
out of a small car is undignified. Having sex is undignified. Doffing your belt 
and spread-eagling to allow a security guard to slide a wand up your crotch 
is undignified. Most pointedly, modern medicine is a gantlet of indignities.
Most readers of this article have undergone a pelvic or rectal examination, 
and many have had the pleasure of a colonoscopy as well. We repeatedly vote 
with our feet (and other body parts) that dignity is a trivial value, well worth 
trading off for life, health, and safety.5
Pinker fails to notice that autonomy is also fungible. Soldiers give up some autonomy 
when they enlist for m ilitary service. Employees give up autonomy when they sign 
contracts agreeing to perform certain services and refrain from doing other activities 
that constitute a conflict o f  interest. Police officers, FBI agents, and politicians 
relinquish autonomy when they swear to enforce the laws o f our nation. Lawyers 
and psychologists give up autonomy in preserving confidentiality. By following 
rules conducive to raising children, day care workers, parents o f  young children, and 
school teachers likewise dim inish their autonomy so as to better serve the young. 
Patients give up all their autonomy— at least tem porarily— when agreeing to lose 
consciousness during surgery. Do the actions o f these people reveal that autonomy 
is a trivial value, well worth trading o ff for money, public order, confidentiality, the 
good o f raising children, or health?
Pinker offers a final rationale for ditching dignity:
Third, dignity can be harmful. In her comments on the Dignity volume,
Jean Bethke Elshtain rhetorically asked, “Has anything good ever come 
from denying or constricting human dignity?” The answer is an emphatic
4 Ibid, original emphasis.
5 Ibid, original emphasis.
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“yes.” Every sashed and be-medaled despot reviewing his troops from a lofty 
platform seeks to command respect through ostentatious displays of dignity. 
Political and religious repressions are often rationalized as a defense of the 
dignity of a state, leader, or creed: Just think of the Salman Rushdie fatwa, 
the Danish cartoon riots, or the British schoolteacher in Sudan who faced 
flogging and a lynch mob because her class named a teddy bear Moham­
med. Indeed, totalitarianism is often the imposition of a leader’s conception 
of dignity on a population, such as the identical uniforms in Maoist China or 
the burqas of the Taliban.6 78910
Pinker fails to note that autonomy can also be harmful to society and to individuals. 
Desmond Hatchett exercised his sexual autonomy by fathering twenty-one children 
with eleven different women before the age o f thirty.7 Similarly, Nadya Suleman, 
unemployed and unm arried, used in vitro fertilization to add eight more babies to her 
other six young children at home.8 Drug abusers exercise their autonomy in harming 
themselves physically and mentally, sometimes to the point where they become a 
drain on society or are driven to steal or even kill to get their fix. Politicians regularly 
exercise their autonomy in such a way as to cause unreasonable taxes, unfair laws, 
and unjust wars for their own political gain. Indeed, autonomy causes more harm, 
arguably much more harm, than dignity.
These tu quoque responses to Pinker are less than satisfactory insofar as real 
questions can and should be raised about the role and im portance o f the concept 
o f dignity in bioethics. Pinker highlights the ambiguous ways in which the term  
“dignity” has been used in bioethics and thereby recognizes an im portant issue 
that deserves serious consideration, something that Pinker h im self fails to offer.9 It 
likewise should be noted that “autonomy” itself is used in various ways and senses 
(Lars 0ystein  Ursin, “Personal Autonomy and Informed Consent,” Medicine, Health 
Care, and Philosophy, February 2009) so the difficulty o f ambiguous use o f term s 
is nothing unique to the term  “dignity,” although adm ittedly “dignity” seems even 
more prone to ambiguous usage than “autonomy.”
So how ought we to define dignity? Daniel P. Sulmasy, O.F.M., has distinguished 
three ways in which the term  is used in contem porary ethical discourse, namely, 
as attributed dignity, intrinsic dignity, and inflorescent dignity.10 Attributed dignity
6 Ibid, original emphasis.
7 John Bingham, “Desmond Hatchett Fathers 21 Children by 11 Women before 
Turning 30,” Telegraph.co.uk, May 29, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews 
/northamerica/usa/5404674/Desmond-Hatchett-fathers-21-children-by-11-women-before 
-turning-30.html.
8 Laura T. Coffey, “As Octuplets Turn 1, the Real Work Is Just Starting,” Today, 
January 26, 2010, http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/34984163/ns/today-today_people/.
9 For further critique of Pinker’s article, see Yuval Levin, “Indignity and Bioethics: 
Steven Pinker Discovers the Human Dignity Cabal,” National Review Online, May 14, 2008, 
http://article.nationalreview.com/357664/indignity -and-bioethics/yuval-levin.
10 Daniel Sulmasy, “Dignity and Bioethics: History, Theory, and Selected Applica­
tions,” in Human Dignity and Bioethics, 473.
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is the worth hum an beings confer on others or on themselves. Attributed dignity 
comes in degrees and is at issue in the examples raised by Pinker. By intrinsic 
dignity Sulmasy means
that worth or value that people have simply because they are human, not by 
virtue of any social standing, ability to evoke admiration, or any particular set 
of talents, skills, or powers. Intrinsic dignity is the value that human beings 
have simply by virtue of the fact that they are human beings. Thus we say that 
racism is an offense against human dignity. Used this way, dignity designates 
a value not conferred or created by human choices, individual or collective, 
but is prior to human attribution. Kant’s notion of dignity is intrinsic.11
Inflorescent dignity, or dignity as flourishing, consists in the excellence o f a human 
life consistent with, and expressive of, intrinsic dignity. Once these senses o f dignity 
are distinguished, the concerns about ambiguity expressed by Pinker are resolved.
Pinker also overlooks the fact that autonomy is not the same as, and cannot 
itself serve to justify, the basic principle he proposes: “Because all hum ans have the 
same m inim um  capacity to suffer, prosper, reason, and choose, no hum an has the 
right to impinge on the life, body, or freedom o f another.” 1 2 I f  he were consistent in 
holding that autonomy is the basis for our rights (rather than the capacity to suffer, 
prosper, reason and choose, a characteristic o f tem porarily unconscious patients 
who lack autonomy), rather than ju st excluding unborn hum an beings from protec­
tion from losing life, bodily rights, or freedom, he would then have to exclude the 
severely mentally handicapped, the senile elderly, and newborns. The principle that 
all hum an beings share the same basic moral im munity from these harm s is the same 
in extension, i f  not also in meaning, as the principle that all hum an beings have a 
shared, basic dignity.
The consequences ofjettisoning a strong conception o f hum an dignity include 
endangering not just the classes o f hum an beings just mentioned, but even human 
beings who are conscious but not fully engaged as rational agents. In his article 
“M inimally Conscious State and Human Dignity,” Jukka Varelius suggests that “as 
persons in minimally conscious state usually remain far from fulfilling the criteria o f 
normal agency, it would also not appear justifiable to grant them the same rights as 
competent agents have” (Neuroethics, April 2009). Read in the most benign light, the 
view is unobjectionable, for a minimally conscious agent does not have the exact same 
rights as a competent agent in term s o f many matters, such as driving cars and entering 
into contracts. But Varelius’s view seems to be that the minimally conscious human 
being does not have the same basic rights as other human beings, but rather falls into 
the same category o f so-called nonpersons as the human fetus and the patient who is 
permanently unconscious. Although his ultimate conclusion in term s o f this m atter 
are not obvious, it is clear that Varelius thinks that we are not justified in holding that 
hum an beings in a minimally conscious state possess hum an dignity.
11 Ibid.
12 Pinker, “Stupidity of Dignity.”
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A fter noting the ambiguity in the ways in which hum an dignity is used in 
bioethical debates, for example, as a premise to argue both for and against physician 
assisted suicide, Varelius takes up and critiques various arguments that hum an beings 
who are m inim ally conscious should be accorded hum an dignity.
Varelius raises the objection that human dignity is inherently unjust toward other 
species. He says that “it could be maintained that granting all and only members o f 
the hum an species special dignity is speciesism and, accordingly, morally on a par 
with such isms as sexism and racism.” We should therefore reject granting dignity 
to all hum an beings as inherently unfair to nonhumans.
This often-repeated charge against hum an dignity rests on two confusions. The 
first is merely linguistic. From the truth that racism and sexism are wrong, we cannot 
simply add “ism” to some class o f characteristics to create a morally illegitimate 
point o f demarcation. A fter all, advocates for animal rights characteristically endorse 
either sentientism (valuing sentient beings over non-sentient beings) or autonomism 
(valuing autonomous beings over non-autonomous beings). To simply assert that 
denying dignity on the basis o f species is as morally dubious as denying dignity on 
the basis o f  race or sex is to beg the question— which is precisely whether nonhuman 
animals are equal in dignity to hum an beings.
Second, even if  speciesism were ethically problematic, a com m itm ent to the 
dignity o f all hum an beings does not involve a denial o f dignity to any other class of 
nonhum an beings simply because they are not human. Those who defend the dignity 
o f all hum an beings need not believe, and characteristically do not believe, that only 
hum ans have dignity. A Catholic view, for example, holds that God the Father, the 
Son, and the Holy Spirit, as well as angels, are also persons with dignity. Even aside 
from religious beliefs, it is possible that there are m any other beings in the universe, 
such as intelligent aliens, that have dignity, for there very well may be many other 
beings in the universe who have a rational nature, and therefore have dignity even 
i f  they are nonhuman. O f course, such beings would not have hum an dignity, since 
they are not human, but they would have dignity. The belief that all hum an beings 
have dignity simply does not imply a commitment to the view that only hum an beings 
have dignity. In other words, the question o f animal rights is simply not answered 
by a com m itm ent to the equal, intrinsic dignity o f all hum an beings.13
In a different critique o f dignity, Varelius writes, “It m ight be m aintained that 
all hum an beings have rational nature by virtue o f having the genetic structure o f 
a rational being. That could work in the case o f the hum an dignity o f otherwise 
norm al persons in m inim ally conscious state. However, the genetic constitution o f 
some nonhum an beings, such as bonobos, can be more sim ilar to the typical genetic 
structure o f humans, the paradigm rational beings, than is that o f genetically defected 
humans.” By proposing another dilemma, he goes on to argue that having the genetic
13 An example of denial of equal human dignity is found in Stephen Bates, “Prenates, 
Postmorts, and Bell-Curve Dignity,” Hastings Center Report 38.4 (July-August 2008): 
21-25.
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structure o f a rational being does not grant dignity. I f  only m inor alterations in the 
genetic structure are perm itted, then m any defective humans do not have it because 
they have m ajor genetic defects. In this case, not all hum an beings have dignity. 
But i f  major alterations in genetic structure are permitted, then nonhum an animals 
would also have rational nature and so would have dignity. In this case, defenders 
o f dignity would have to embrace a strong com mitment to animals rights, which 
they characteristically do not want to do (even though anim al rights are not logically 
excluded by a com mitment to the dignity o f all hum an beings).
In his forthcoming article in the Journal o f  M oral Philosophy, titled “The Basis 
o f Hum an Status,” the prolific and insightful S. M atthew Liao has provided a basis 
for an answer to this argument by escaping the first horn o f the dilemma. In this 
article, Liao offers an im portant new way ofjustifying hum an dignity by m eans o f a 
shared genetic basis for agency. This justification avoids the charge o f “speciesism,” 
since nonhumans m ay have a genetic basis for agency. He also responds to critiques 
o f the kind offered by Varelius:
The genetic defects that we are likely to encounter in these severely defective 
human beings are not defects in the genetic basis for moral agency but at 
best defects that undermine the development for moral agency. For example, 
consider phenylketonuria (PKU), Tay-Sachs, Sandhoff disease and a whole 
cluster of about 7,000 other kinds of genetic disorders, which are caused 
by the mutation of a gene. The gene is typically necessary for producing a 
certain protein or enzyme, which is then needed to change certain chemicals 
to other chemicals or to carry substances from one place to another. Mental 
retardation and other defects are typically caused by abnormal build-ups of 
certain amino acids that become toxic to the brain and other tissues, because 
the cell is unable to process these amino acids owing to the mutation. But 
with treatment of a low enzyme diet as soon as possible in the neonatal age, 
normal growth and cognitive development can be expected in many cases. For 
our purpose, this shows that the brain tissue has initially developed normally 
and would have continued to do so except for the abnormal build-up of the 
amino acids. Therefore, following the distinction between genetic defects that 
make up an attribute and genetic defects that undermine the development of 
the attribute, single gene defects seem to be cases of the latter rather than the 
former. Given this, one can say that human beings who have these kinds of 
genetic defects most likely have the genetic basis for moral agency.14
If  Liao is correct, even hum an beings with severe genetic defects that undermine the 
development o f a particular attribute would still have the genetic basis for rationality, 
and this would also separate them  from higher order primates. Varelius’s argument, 
in other words, rests on m isunderstanding o f the nature o f genetic defects.
One more objection to human dignity raised by Varelius and echoed by various 
neo-Darwinists is that, “in light o f evolution, it can be argued, there are no real 
or important differences between such species as, for example, humans and great 
apes.”
14 S. Matthew Liao, “The Basis of Human Moral Status,” Journal o f  Moral Philosophy 
7.2 (April 2010): 167.
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Do we differentiate hum an beings and great apes on the basis o f  differences 
that are not “real” but merely figments o f our imagination? On the contrary, there 
are objective, empirically verifiable differences between the species in term s o f 
appearance, behavior, reproductive possibilities, and genetic constitution. Are these 
differences unim portant? One can adm it a shared origin o f all species and yet also 
recognize that from this shared origin, species have developed that are really and 
substantially different. In some cases, the real and substantial difference is more 
radical (bacteria and hum an beings) and in other cases less radical (great apes and 
hum an beings), but in every case it is substantial. I f  the hum an species is substan­
tially different from others species, it is not unfair to treat them  in ways that accord 
with this difference.15
That hum an beings differ from all other species and that this difference is 
ethically germane, are recognized even by some advocates o f neo-Darwinism . 
Ben Dixon, for example, offers a “Darwin-approved argum ent for hum an dignity 
[that] centers on the idea that hum ans are the only creatures capable o f creating, 
maintaining, and expanding institutions for moral reasons.”16 He argues that this is 
a difference in kind and not ju st in degree between hum an beings and nonhuman 
animals. In this, he does distance h im self from the historical Darwin who wrote, 
“The difference in m ind between m an and higher animals, great as it is, is certainly 
one o f degree and not o f kind.” 17 Yet, i f  Dixon is correct, then we have yet another 
basis for hum an dignity, aside from the Christian and Kantian foundations already 
widely proposed and the genetic basis suggested in Liao’s article mentioned earlier. 
Doubtless the dispute between advocates and deniers o f human dignity will continue, 
yet the debate has been stimulated considerably by these recent contributions.
Christopher K aczor, Ph .D.
Loyola M arym ount University 
Los Angeles, California
15 On this point, see also Christopher Knapp, “Species Inegalitarianism as a Matter of 
Principle,” Journal o f Applied Philosophy 26.2 (May 2009): 174-189.
16 Ben Dixon, “Darwinism and Human Dignity,” Environmental Values 16.1 (Febru­
ary 2007): 24.
17 Quoted ibid, 38.
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